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COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO. v. BENSON CO.
vorce suit, or where a change of custody is sought by direct
proceeding in equity. The situation in the principal case
raises the question of the desirability of a legislative change
to make it possible to receive a court order for future support-as distinguished from the more awkward reimbursement for necessaries advanced-without a criminal prosecution, a divorce suit, or proceeding to change a present
custody.
In favor of the change is the argument that if it is desirable to award future orders in those situations, it is equally
desirable to award them in any situations where it is
necessary to go to court to compel a father to perform his
duty to support his child. Against such a change is the
point that the future order is a drastic procedure, to be
availed of only in the more stringent situations which are
apparent when it is necessary to prosecute a father criminally, or where the parents are being divorced, or where a
change of custody of the child is imminent. As was pointed
out in the trial court opinion in the Yost case, to permit the
award of future support when there is not happening any
such drastic and abrupt event might tend to impair the harmony of happy family life.
But then it might be argued that, as long as we have by
statute legalized separation agreements which provide for
future support, we should also make provision for handling
situations where the spouses cannot agree on the regular
amount of support for children.
LOAN DISTINGUISHED FROM AGENCY-LIABILITY
OF LENDER AS PRINCIPAL ON CONTRACTS MADE
BY BORROWER WITH THIRD PARTIES
Commercial Credit Co. v. L. A. Benson Co.'
Defendant-appellant, a commercial loan corporation, advanced money to the Poole Engineering Company which was
a manufacturing corporation, to be used by the latter in
carrying out its contracts for the construction of voting
machines. The defendant was to receive interest on the
loan and a certain bonus for each machine made. The Poole
Company later encountered difficulty in completing the machine contracts and the defendant agreed to furnish more
money upon the stipulation that it be allowed to place two
representatives in the manufacturing plant to check on the
1170 Md. 270, 184 At
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expenditures made and the application of incoming funds.
This was done. Later the Poole Company went into bankruptcy, and plaintiff-appellee, which had supplied materials
to the Poole Company during the period in which defendant
was advancing money, sued defendant as an undisclosed
principal of the machine manufacturing corporation.
The trial court refused to grant defendant company's
demurrer prayers to the evidence. The fact of agency was
left to the jury which found for the plaintiff. On appeal,
held: Reversed without new trial. The relation between
the parties to the loan was that of debtor and creditor. The
chief concern of the loan corporation was to regain the
money advanced and compensation for its use. There was
an entire lack of evidence tending to show a principal-agent
relationship. The manufacturer was not subject to the defendant's control, as the latter's representatives in the
plant of the former acted in an advisory capacity only. Such
an arrangement was consonant with the attempt of a creditor to protect his investment. Defendant's demurrer
prayers to the evidence should have been granted.
The principal problem is that of distinguishing a mere
loan from an agency. As the implications arising from such
a distinction are various, it should be noted at the outset
that the principal case, involving the undisclosed principal
situation is but a phase of the larger problem mentioned,
and should be treated as such. This is indicated by the
statement in the opinion in the principal case that, in order
to find an undisclosed principal, it must first be established
that there was a principal at all, and that to do that, there
must be established an agency relationship between the
parties.2
Certain general principles of agency might be quickly
reviewed at this point in order for comment to be made upon
the instant problem. These involve, first, the creation of an
agency and, second, the contract liability of a principal to
third parties.
2 The word "parties" may be considered as a general all-inclusive term,
although it might become apparent that certain groups would be excluded
from the principles enunciated by reason of an inherent incapacity. For
example, the principles of agency as applied to corporations might present
the question of ultra vires. It is not within the scope of this casenote to
comment upon such separate questions unless directly involved.
However, as to the power of one corporation to act as agent for another,
see Alley v. Bessemer Gas Engine Co., 262 Fed. 94 (D. Tex., 1919) ; Liberty
Coal Mining Co. v. Frankel Coal Co., 206 Ky. 647, 268 S. W. 280 (1924). As
to the establishing of a corporation as principal, see In re Kentucky Wagon
Mfg. Co., 3 Fed. Supp. 958 (D. Ky. 1932); American National Bank v.
National Wall Paper Co., 23 C. C. A. 33, 77 Fed. 85 (1896) ; Westinghouse
Electric and Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 100 C. C. A. 408, 176 Fed. 362

(1910).
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1. Agency is the relationship resulting from the mutual
consent of the parties, one party, the agent, agreeing to act
on behalf of the other, the principal, and subject to his control. It is not necessary that the parties intend to subject
themselves to the liabilities imposed upon them as the result
of their acts, and the legal relation of agency may arise by
written or oral agreement, or by the conduct of the parties
themselves.8
2. It is a general rule that a principal is liable upon the
contracts of his agent when made within the scope of the
agent's express, implied, or apparent authority. This rule
applies to an undisclosed principal, who, at the election of
the third party, may be held liable upon simple4 non-negotiable contracts made by his agent, although the third party
dealt with such agent in ignorance of the existence of the
principal, 5 unless such third party gave an exclusive credit
to the agent.' Where a third party wishes to hold an undisclosed principal upon a contract, he must show that there
existed an actual agency, whether implied or not. An undisclosed principal cannot be held liable upon the theory of
"agency by estoppel", because his non-disclosure precludes
any holding out by the principal.7 However, where one person does hold out another as an agent, such person may
incur liability as a principal.'
The above mentioned principles seem to have been
grafted by the courts upon loan contracts in proper cases,
and the question whether a particular transaction is a mere
loan, creating only a lender-borrower situation, or is a principal-agent relation, generally depends upon a consideration of the whole arrangement between the parties. The
courts look to the terms of the agreement as well as the
intent of the persons involved, as otherwise expressed. If
the parties regard the money advanced as a mere loan, and
the money is used in a business in which the lender takes no
interest, there is generally no basis upon which to raise an
agency relationship.' If, however, the money is advanced
without expectation of repayment to be used in a venture
8 Restatement of Agency, Secs. 1, 14. That the relation of principal and
agent may be implied from the words or conduct of the parties see Heise
& Bruns v. Goldman, 125 Md. 554, 559, 94 Atl. 159 (1915).
"See Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 15, as to sealed instruments.
Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, See. 1731.
8 Restatement of Agency, Sec. 186. See also York County Bank v. Stein,
24 Md. 447 (1866).
795 A. L. R. 1319. Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 1763. Also,
Abuc Trading Corp. v. Jennings, 151 Md. 392, 135 Atl. 166 (1926).
S See Himmel v. Merchants Transfer & Storage Co., 134 Md. 38, 106 AtI.
157 (1919).
9 2 C. J. S. 1030 Agency, Sec. 1, g.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
wherein the lender is to share in the profits and to exercise
some measure of control, the courts have often found an
agency, partnership, or joint adventure."
An outstanding text-writer says of the matter:
"Where there has been no holding out as principal,
courts in modern times endeavour to give effect to the
real intention of the parties, and not to charge one as a
principal or partner who did not intend to become such,
unless that is the necessary legal effect of the arrangement.) Y,11
A glance at certain typical cases which have dealt with
the instant problem will serve to bring out applicable general principles. Thus, in the Kansas case of Burton v.
Larkin,2 A contracted to furnish B with money to pay B's
current expenses. C, having supplied goods to B, now sued
A on the theory that A was a principal. There was evidently
nothing to show that A had held B out as an agent, and the
court said that the agreement between A and B was a mere
loan.
In contrast is the Iowa case of Van Sandt v. Dows.
There A furnished B with money to buy corn to be marked
with A's name. A was to sell the grain and to deduct from
the proceeds his original advances plus eight per cent. interest and one cent per bushel sold, B to receive the balance.
The court held that this was an agency contract, and not a
mere loan. The court considered the fact that the title to
the grain was in A, and that B had acted on A's behalf and
upon A's authority. As a matter of comparison, suppose A
bought grain on his own account and at his own risk, and
then supplied it to B, who sold it, crediting A with the sale,
deducting B's expenses and commissions? In such a case,
would A be a mere lender interested only in regaining his
investment plus compensation for its use? It would seem
not, in the light of the fact that A's return would be predicated, not upon the value of the material "loaned", but upon
the price realized at B's sale. In a Texas case, 4 which had
'o Ibid. The question of a loan contract involving a partnership or joint
adventure is not included In this comment; but for an interesting discussion
of the possibilities, see Annotation, 48 A. L. R. 1055, 1072. See also, Atlas
Realty Co. v. Galt, 153 Md. 586, 139 Atl. 285 (1927).
,, Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, See. 55.
1236 Kan. 246, 13 Pac. 398 (1887).
See also, Owl Fumigating Corp. v.
California Cyanide Co., 24 Fed. (2d) 718 (D. Del., 1928), to the effect that
a mere loan of money by one corporation to another does not make the
borrower the agent of the lender.
"63 Iowa 594, 19 N. W. 669 (1884).
"Davis and Hamm Commission Co. v. Mt. Vernon Bank, 63 Tex. Clv.
A. 347, 133 S. W. 448 (1910).
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almost identical facts, the court held that the relation of
principal and agent did not exist, but merely that of lender
and borrower.
The Maine case of Chase v. West 5 presented a somewhat
more involved situation. There A contracted with B corporation, agreeing to finance certain lumbering operations
for the latter. A was to pay for the land and to supply
money for initial work, while B was to go upon the land, to
cut the lumber and to sell it. A was to handle the proceeds
obtained from the sales and to apply them to accounts accruing against the operations. A was to receive the money
advanced plus an additional sum, at which time A was to
convey the property to B, who should thereafter assume all
debts. C sold materials to B corporation, and sought to
hold A liable as undisclosed principal. The court held that
the contract did not create the relation of principal and
agent, as the manifest purpose was the financing of B's lumbering operations. In its opinion the court, looking at the
transaction as a whole, said:
"Defendant's (A) connection with the matter was
temporary, incidental, and only for the purpose of securing the advancement and bonus. . . . A principal
does not usually make a formal contract with his agent
as to what the principal shall pay. He does not ordinarily require the agent to supply the whole or even a
part of the capital needed for carrying on the principal's business. He commonly directs his agent, and
does not mutually agree with him as to what contracts
shall be made. . . . Defendant had no interest in the
profits except as security for the payment of a fixed
sum. . . . Defendant had no authority to control the
lumbering operations. . . . The contract did not make
the corporation an agent to purchase supplies upon the
credit of defendant." '16
There is another group of cases, including the principal
case, which present a more subtle situation. Suppose A
loans B money to be used in B's business. Later, B's financial position becomes precarious, and A desires to protect
his investment. To what lengths may A go to do this without involving himself as a principal upon contracts made by
B with third parties? In the principal case, the defendant
was no doubt in the first instance a mere lender of money;
but did subsequent developments modify its status? The
15 121 Me. 165, 116 At. 213 (1922).
s Ibid, 116 Ati. 214.
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court said not, keeping in mind the facts that the defendant
owned no stock in the debtor corporation nor had any representation upon its board of directors, that the corporate
structure of the debtor was not affected, that the debtor
never surrendered its business to the creditor, and that the
services of the creditor's representatives were rendered in
an advisory, co-operative, and consulting capacity, with no
authority to compel compliance with their advice.
Compare the principal case with a lower court Federal
decision, Chicago Lumber Co. v. Bank.1 7 There, the Bank
loaned sums of money to A corporation. Later the Bank
became dissatisfied with the internal management of the
corporation. Several officers and stockholders of the latter
sold their interests to one B, who secured for them a release
from the Bank of personal obligations owed by them to the
Bank. B became sole stockholder of the debtor corporation,
and assumed personal liability for the money owed to the
Bank, giving the Bank all of the stock of the debtor corporation as security. Then a cashier of the Bank was elected
president of the debtor company "to protect the interests
of the Bank", said president receiving several shares of the
corporate stock subject to the aforementioned pledge. C
now contracted with the debtor corporation; and when the
latter went bankrupt, C sued the Bank as a principal. C
claimed that the Bank held the debtor corporation out as an
agent. There was not sufficient evidence to support C's
theory of "agency by estoppel", but in dealing with the
question of an actual agency, the court stated that where
one corporation owned or controlled all the property of another, and operated the business of the latter as a department of its own, that such controlling corporation would be
responsible for obligations incurred by the other, but that
such liability would not be imposed when a creditor corporation should interest itself in the business of a debtor
corporation of doubtful solvency, even if it should go to the
extent of actively taking a part in the management of said
debtor company, in order to protect its investment as a
creditor.
A closer analysis of the cases presented furnishes
ground for speculation whether the courts, consciously or
not, lean in the favor of a creditor who interests himself in
his debtor's business to protect a doubtful investment, and
fail to see the significance of the creditor's conduct, which
in other circumstances would hardly be overlooked. One of
the most distinctive, if not decisive, elements of agency is
17

234 Fed. 41 (D. Mo., 1916).
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the factor of control. It is the sine qua non of an agency
relationship, and is the foundation of the maxim "qui facit
per alium facit per se". The word control standing by
itself in this connection is somewhat ambiguous. It is subject to at least two interpretations, one being the direction
of physical movements, the other being action by the authority of another. It is the latter concept which is the
essence of agency and which is closely interrelated with the
representative quality of agency. An agent does not merely
act "for" his principal, but he acts "on behalf of" him,
that is to say, he acts not upon his own responsibility (as
does an independent contractor) but upon the authorization
of the principal. The question of physical control is only
important when it is necessary to distinguish an agent from
a servant. The element of authoritative control may be
largely of a subjective nature, and its legal determination
necessarily depends upon its objectivity as seen through the
conduct of the parties. Therefore, it should behoove the
courts to scrutinize with great care the acts of said parties,
and to give due regard to what might excite a reasonable
suspicion. Take, for example, the "advisory activities" of
the defendant in the principal case. There is hardly any
doubt that mere advice does not establish an agency relationship, but when that advice is so closely connected with
other dubious relations it should be judged in connection
therewith. The set-up between the creditor and debtor in
the instant case was not without certain equivocal features.
The debtor corporation is about to go insolvent and close;
the creditor steps in with a very understandable desire to
prevent the taking of a loss; the debtor has practically
proved itself unable to cope with the difficulties, so the
creditor determines to offer its advice, and in so doing
checks upon all purchases of materials and the application
of incoming credits. Should not a court look at least with
suspicion upon such an arrangement and be sure that what
in the beginning was supposed to be advice did not in reality
become a direction by tacit agreement? It is submitted that
the courts cannot be too careful in their examination of such
an arrangement, for it involves not only the rights of the
immediate parties, but the rights of other creditors who
have been contracting with the debtor. If the courts are not
alert, a creditor might by a tacit understanding under the
guise of "advice" direct a debtor into making numerous
contracts otherwise not contemplated, and when the debtor
goes insolvent escape all responsibility therefor, even
though he had stood to profit had events taken another turn.
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It must be admitted that the Federal decision mentioned
goes to extreme limits in its efforts to help the creditor.
This court failed to find anything suspicious in an arrangement whereby the creditor was actively represented on the
directorate of the debtor corporation and necessarily had a
direct voice in all important decisions involving contracts
with third parties. Yet the court used these words: "The
Bank's actions were referable to a legitimate and customary
practice of keeping an oversight by a creditor over the business of a debtor of doubtful solvency". It is not the intention of the present commentator to state flatly that in all
cases involving the intervention of a creditor in the business of his debtor such intervention automatically establishes a principal-agent relation; but it is most strongly
contended that such an arrangement should be closely
searched in order to seek out the element of authoritative
control, so that what may have been at first a mere lenderborrower situation does not later become an agency relationship whereby the creditor authorizes the debtor as agent
to collect his own debt. The Federal decision seems to allow
the creditor to escape liability unless he should be so injudicious as to constitute the debtor a mere servant. The factors
of agency are the same, whether A goes into B's business
for a profit, or whether he intervenes in said business to
collect a debt; and the rights of third party contractors
should be as zealously guarded in the one case as in the
other.
The principal case seems to present an unique situation
as far as Maryland cases are concerned. Whether the
Maryland Court would follow the Federal decision if presented with the same facts is largely conjectural. It must
be reiterated in this connection that in the principal case
the Court failed to find a scintilla of evidence showing an
agency relation, and looked upon the "advisory" activities
of the creditor with perfect equanimity. However, it did
note the absence of any representation by the creditor upon
the directorate of the debtor corporation, and thereby impliedly considered that as some evidence tending to show
agency, should it be present.
It is interesting to note that exactly the same facts as
were involved in the principal case were presented to the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland in
Doehler Die Castinq Co. v. Commercial Credit Co. 18 This
latter case also arose out of the Commercial Credit Coin"' Both the charge to the jury and the opinion denying the motion for
new trial appear in The Daily Record, December 50, 1932.

HEWITT v. SHIPLEY
pany's financing of the Poole Engineering Company. The
District Court's charge to the jury and the opinion denying
a motion for new trial took an opposite view of the law of
the situation from that of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
in the instant case. There was an appeal taken therein
from the judgment rendered for the plaintiff, but the case
was settled before it was argued on appeal.

THE EFFECT OF A SEPARATION AGREEMENT
UPON THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S
RIGHT TO ADMINISTER
Hewitt v. Shipley'
Husband filed a petition in the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City claiming that he had received no notice before
letters of administration were granted his brother-in-law,
and that he, as surviving spouse, was legally entitled to
administer and share in the estate of his deceased wife. The
answer denied the right of the husband to notice of the
granting of letters because the husband had surrendered all
his rights in the estate of the deceased wife by virtue of an
agreement of separation between him and her. The pertinent provisions of that separation agreement provided that
the husband pay the wife a named sum of money and the
costs of a pending divorce proceeding and relinquish claim
on certain named property as a fair and just provision for
her; that the settlement be in lieu of all the property rights
of the wife against the husband whether vested, inchoate or
anticipated as wife, widow, heir, or next of kin; that "all
the property of the wife, both real and personal, now held
by her or which shall hereafter come to her, shall be and
remain her sole and separate property, free from all the
rights of the husband, with full power to her to convey, assign, or deal with the same as if she were single ;" and that
he would sign the necessary papers. From an order
granting the petition, the administrator appealed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the order. Held: A separation
agreement will not be construed to bar the right of a surviving spouse in the estate of the other, unless it is clearly
expressed therein, or necessarily implied therefrom. Therefore the grant of letters to another was improper in this
case where there was no express bar and none was necessarily implied.
1169 Md. 221, 181 At]. 84
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